The design of contracts: Evidence from Japanese subcontracting
- 30 September 1987
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 1 (3) , 327-349
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0889-1583(87)90014-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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