An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
Top Cited Papers
- 1 June 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 80 (3) , 603-626
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.007
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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