Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory

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Abstract
Authors of several case studies of international conflict have claimed that the frequency with which statesmen are surprised by the way other governments respond to challenges is inconsistent with rational deterrence theory. Some have contended that the behavior of decision-makers is better explained by theories of cognitive or even affective psychology. The main issue raised by these critics is decision-makers' use of the information available to them, especially information about the commitments of other governments, and their incentive to protect their reputations by carrying out their threats. Only recently, however, have game-theoretic techniques been developed which permit the formalization of theories of deterrence that incorporate incomplete information, learning and the development of reputations. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the question of how much misperception by foreign policy decision-makers is consistent with rationality, in light of these new developments in game theory.

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