Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment
- 1 October 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 21 (1-2) , 282-308
- https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0524
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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