Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information
- 1 October 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 30 (4) , 297-301
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90081-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with DiscountingThe Review of Economic Studies, 1987
- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with DiscountingEconometrica, 1985
- Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazardJournal of Economic Theory, 1983
- Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An IntroductionThe Review of Economic Studies, 1983
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent RelationshipEconometrica, 1981