Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies
- 1 January 2004
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 71 (1) , 217-234
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00282
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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