Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection

Preprint

1 January 2001

preprint
Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.250771

Abstract

In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lending contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited l

Keywords

GROUP LENDING
ADVERSE SELECTION
COLLUSION
DEVELOPMENT

All Related Versions

Version 1, 2000-01-01, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
Version 1, 2000-01-01, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)

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