Dynamics in Ownership and Firm Survival: Evidence from Corporate Germany
- 20 February 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 10 (1) , 167-195
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2004.00244.x
Abstract
This study investigates the determinants of changes in corporate ownership and firm failure for German firms. We find that many of the determinants of failure also affect ownership changes in this bank‐based economy. They include poor performance, weak corporate governance, high leverage, and small firm size. The ownership structure also plays a role for both events. Separate analyses of one of these events are therefore likely to miss important effects. The implications for the German corporate governance system are that the differences to countries with more market‐based systems are not as pronounced as previously speculated.Keywords
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