Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information
Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 44 (6) , 793-807
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002700044006005
Abstract
Conflict and war are typically viewed as the outcome of misperceptions, incomplete information, or even irrationality. The authors show that it can be otherwise. Despite the short-run incentives to settle disputes peacefully, there can be long-term, compounding rewards to going to war when doing better relative to one's opponent today implies doing better tomorrow. Peaceful settlement involves not only sharing the pie available today but also foregoing the possibility, brought about by war, of gaining a permanent advantage over one's opponent into the future. The authors show how war emerges as an equilibrium outcome in a model that takes these considerations into account. War is more likely to occur, the more important is the future.Keywords
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