On the incentives for security analysts to revise their earnings forecasts*
- 1 September 1990
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 7 (1) , 203-222
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1990.tb00810.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Analysts' forecasts as earnings expectationsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1988
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling GamesEconometrica, 1987
- Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts?Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986
- The information content of financial analysts' forecasts of earningsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1979