Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare
- 12 July 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 37 (3) , 590-612
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00239.x
Abstract
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All Related Versions
This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
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