Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
How do individuals achieve "good outcomes" in one-shot strategic situations? One possibility is that they engage in some kind of preplay communicationKeywords
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