Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
- 1 January 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 37 (1) , 97-106
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00018-3
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Model of Pre-game CommunicationJournal of Economic Theory, 1994
- Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomesGames and Economic Behavior, 1992
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a societyJournal of Economic Theory, 1991
- Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form gamesEconomics Letters, 1991
- Cheap talk can matter in bargainingJournal of Economic Theory, 1989
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibriumEconomics Letters, 1988
- Cheap Talk, Coordination, and EntryThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1987
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium conceptInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1978