Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
- 1 July 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 4 (3) , 422-425
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90047-v
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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