Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- 1 June 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 48 (1) , 264-303
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0
Abstract
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