Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
Top Cited Papers
- 1 July 2006
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 73 (3) , 577-610
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00388.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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