Coordination and Control in a Government Agency: Contingency and Institutional Theory Perspectives on GAO Audits

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Abstract
Drawing on both contingency and institutional theories, this paper examines how professionals in an institutionalized environment are coordinated and controlled and what forces shape the structures organizations adopt for this coordination and control. According to contingency theory, the coordination and control of organizational members is shaped by the task environment and the technical nature of the work they perform, while institutional theory proposes that an organization's need to demonstrate conformity to institutionalized expectations of rational practice also influences its choice of control and coordination mechanisms. We use both theoretical perspectives to develop hypotheses that are tested with data from a study of 96 audit teams in the United States General Accounting Office (GAO). Results show that the more institutionalized the environment, (a) the more the organization relies on a bureaucratic mode of control, (b) the greater the task difficulty and team interdependence and the more the organization relies on personal and group modes of control, and (c) the more the organization relies on personal and group modes of control to improve audit-team performance.