Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government
- 1 February 1988
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 56 (2) , 131-152
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00115753
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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