How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants
Top Cited Papers
- 10 September 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 63 (5) , 2085-2121
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01391.x
Abstract
We identify a specific channel (debt covenants) and the corresponding mechanism (transfer of control rights) through which financing frictions impact corporate investment. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that capital investment declines sharply following a financial covenant violation, when creditors use the threat of accelerating the loan to intervene in management. Further, the reduction in investment is concentrated in situations in which agency and information problems are relatively more severe, highlighting how the state‐contingent allocation of control rights can help mitigate investment distortions arising from financing frictions.This publication has 52 references indexed in Scilit:
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