The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels
Top Cited Papers
Open Access
- 30 November 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 24 (6) , 1241-1266
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.002
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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