Social Incentives and the Preservation of Reputation in Public-Spirited Collective Action
- 1 April 1992
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Political Science Review
- Vol. 13 (2) , 171-198
- https://doi.org/10.1177/019251219201300203
Abstract
Large-scale cooperation can often be manufactured out of small- scale relationships. People frequently cooperate in large-scale ventures in order to protect their reputations in everyday relationships, since an esteemed reputation has considerable instrumental value in a community. Moreover, regular social interaction is conducive not only to the develop ment of obligations and commitments, but also to the formation of other- regarding interests. These arguments are illustrated with a series of examples from the civil rights movement in the United States and other instances of collective action.Keywords
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