The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors
- 1 December 2005
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 11 (4) , 139-167
- https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00374.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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