Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly knownKeywords
All Related Versions
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