Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
- 1 October 1988
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 46 (1) , 97-119
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90151-2
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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