Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- 1 July 2005
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 44 (3) , 269-302
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-005-4692-y
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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