Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
- 1 February 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 53 (1) , 131-145
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90145-t
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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