Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule
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- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 2 (2-3) , 162-192
- https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323067916
Abstract
Many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats, who implement highly inefficient economic policies, expropriate the wKeywords
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