The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons
Open Access
- 1 June 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 34 (2) , 270-290
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002790034002005
Abstract
Three questions are addressed in this study: (1) Does a nuclear retaliatory capability contribute to extended deterrence against a nonnuclear power? (2) If so, is the deterrent value of nuclear weapons contingent upon the prior credible threat of conventional armed engagement by the defender? (3) Or, is the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons so potent that the conventional balance of forces has little deterrent impact? Competing hypotheses are formulated and then tested by probit analysis. The empirical findings indicate that (a) nuclear weapons do contribute to extended deterrence success, but (b) that effect is not contingent upon the prior threat of conventional armed conflict, and (c) there is an inverse relationship between the conventional balance of forces and the extended deterrent role of nuclear weapons.Keywords
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