Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games
- 1 January 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 4 (1) , 72-100
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90006-e
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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