Women's Nonmarket Labor

Abstract
Recent divorce law reforms have resulted in reduced spousal support payments of limited duration as attorneys and judges focus on equal treatment of spouses. Traditional family patterns persist, however, leaving husbands and wives in unequal positions to support themselves at divorce. Couples in long-term marriages maintain established roles and younger couples continue to choose the traditional division of labor. Wives invest in their husbands' careers by engaging in full- or part-time housekeeping and child care. Women's discontinuous labor force participation leads to skill depreciation and loss of seniority, accompanied by decreased earning power. Equal treatment at divorce requires that wives be compensated for the opportunity cost of these years spent in nonmarket labor. Family economists are encouraged to further develop formulas for opportunity cost calculation. Specialists in family management and relations are challenged to initiate programs to help couples in the process of assessing long-term effects of the allocation of human resources. Judges and attorneys are urged to recognize the economic value of wives' career opportunity cost and to develop divorce settlements that compensate women for their decreased earning power.