Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
Open Access
- 1 January 2002
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 56 (4) , 751-774
- https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760403766
Abstract
Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments - Volume 56 Issue 4 - Philip Keefer, David StasavageKeywords
All Related Versions
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