Coercive tender and exchange offers in distressed high-yield debt restructurings An empirical analysis
- 1 July 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 38 (3) , 333-360
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00815-i
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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