Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
- 31 December 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 15 (3) , 217-230
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(86)90011-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Acceptable points in games of perfect informationPacific Journal of Mathematics, 1960