Motives for Giving: A Reanalysis of Two Classic Public Goods Experiments
- 1 July 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 77 (1) , 15-26
- https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.15
Abstract
Experimental work in economics prompted the development of theories of other‐regarding behavior. In this article we reanalyze two classic public goods experiments and focus on the nature of individuals' responses to others' behavior in order to help distinguish alternative motives for giving, including altruism, warm glow, reciprocity, and inequality aversion. Analysis that allows for asymmetric feedback responses generates support for inequality aversion motives but little for reciprocity (matching), altruism, and warm glow. We conclude that individual‐level analysis of existing public goods data can provide more insightful, informative estimates of treatment effects.Keywords
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