Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings
Open Access
- 31 March 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 91 (1) , 91-105
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2586
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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