Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems
- 1 December 1994
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 1 (1) , 365-380
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02716633
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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