Business Groups, Bank Control, and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers
- 30 April 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 9 (2) , 117-148
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jfin.2000.0281
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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