A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?
- 26 February 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 40 (2) , 319-338
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00849-a
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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