Is Revolution Individually Rational?
- 1 January 1994
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 6 (1) , 139-166
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463194006001008
Abstract
An examination of the free rider problem in revolutionary action suggests that this problem can be, and historically has been, overcome by drawing on norms of solidarity developed in preexisting groups, which gain individuals' commitment by providing commonly needed public goods. A simple model of rational action by groups, based on considerations of individual solidarity and cross-group interactions, then predicts many of the well-known macrofeatures of revolutions in different kinds of societies.Keywords
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