Limiting Central Bank Credit to the Government: Theory and Practice
- 1 January 1993
- book
- Published by International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Abstract
This paper examines central bank independence with reference to the constraints on central bank credit to the government, focusing on how such credit should be regulated. It discusses why credit should be contsrained, and in which forms, and how to implement those constraints.All Related Versions
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