The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries
Preprint
- 1 June 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The rapidly growing literature studying the relationship between legal origin, investor protection and finance has stimulated an important debate in academic circles. It has also generated a cottage industry of applied research and strong policy statements. This paper discusses the implications, in particular for developing and transition countries, from this literature. Our general conclusion is that its focus on the plight of small investors is too narrow when applied to these countries. We argue that this group is unlikely to play an important role in most developing and transition countries. External investors may still be crucial, particularly in transition countries, but they are more likely to come in as strategic investors or creditors. The paper also proposes a broader paradigm including other stakeholders and mechanisms of governance in order to better understand the problems facing these countries and generate policy implications that compensate for the weaknesses of capital markets.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
- Transition as a process of large-scale institutional changePublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,2008
- Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?Stanford Law Review, 2000
- Soft Budget Constraints and Banking in Transition EconomiesJournal of Comparative Economics, 1998
- Privatization, Competition, and Budget Constraints: Disciplining Enterprises in RussiaSSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
- Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate ControlThe Journal of Finance, 1998
- Does Market Structure Matter? New Evidence from RussiaSSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
- DisorganizationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997
- Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the FirmThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997
- Reforming corporate governance: redirecting the European agendaEconomic Policy, 1997
- A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate LawHarvard Law Review, 1996