Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-1979
- 1 June 1986
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 30 (2) , 315-326
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002786030002005
Abstract
Using data collected by Jensen (1984), we investigate whether cooperative and inverse reciprocity can successfully predict U.S. and Soviet actions during the 23 rounds of strategic arms negotiation during the 1969-1979 period. Each type of reciprocity gives rise to three models of bargaining behavior, which we implement as computer routines. In our analysis, we find that the cooperative reciprocity models fit more often than inverse reciprocity models.Keywords
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