Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is good for society. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model where more transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's true policy intentions. This induces the central bank to pay relatively much attention to inflation stabilization. In contrast with popular perceptions and most existing literature, I find that transparency need not always be advantageous. It may actually be a policy distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys good initial credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- “Know” and Its Japanese Counterparts, Shitte-iru and Wakatte-iruPublished by Oxford University Press (OUP) ,2018
- Library Quarterly (LQ)Published by Brill ,2017
- Table 1: M1 size, M2/M1 and M3/M1 scores of locations examined.Published by PeerJ ,2016
- F. Ausblick auf die literarischen Horizonte von Ri 1.17–21 am Übergang von Jos zu RiPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,2016
- A dynamic seamless modeling method for the global multi-scale terrain based on DQGPublished by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ,2015
- On the \lq \lq Galois closure\rq \rq for torsorsProceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 2009
- Very-Low Voltage (VLV) and VLV Ratio (VLVR) Testing for Quality, Reliability, and Outlier Detection2006 IEEE International Test Conference, 2006
- CopyrightPublished by Elsevier ,1973