A model of duopoly and meeting or beating competition
- 1 January 1987
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 5 (4) , 399-417
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(87)80003-6
Abstract
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This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Limited liability contracts between principal and agentJournal of Economic Theory, 1983
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric InformationEconometrica, 1981
- Efficient Incentive ContractsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980
- Efficient Collusion and Reaction FunctionsCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1978