Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game
- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- other
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 5 (2) , 111-126
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1527002503261485
Abstract
This article explores the standard 2-team model of talent choice in a professional sports league and argues that the application of Nash concepts leads to a different equilibrium than that which is normally identified. In particular, it is shown that the invariance principle for gate-revenue sharing no longer holds. Because the standard model, which is here called the Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture model, is widely taught in sports management and economics programs, these finding have important implications for teachers as well as researchers.Keywords
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