Bounded Rationality in Taking Risks and Drawing Inferences
- 1 May 1992
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Theory & Psychology
- Vol. 2 (2) , 225-230
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354392022009
Abstract
This commentary provides a discussion of the concept of `bounded rationality' as it applies to the theses advanced by Lopes (1991) and Evans (1991). Lopes's (1991) assessment of the irrationalist consequences of Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) work on heuristics and biases is premature because bounded rationality implies that people could not employ optimal strategies. Considerations of bounded rationality also provide additional criteria by which to judge the theories of deductive reasoning discussed by Evans (1991). Judged by this criterion, theories whose goal is to explain logically competent performance are inadequate (Oaksford & Chater, 1991). Thus Evans's assessment of the state of current theories of reasoning requires revision.Keywords
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