Rethinking Federalism
- 1 November 1997
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 11 (4) , 43-64
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.43
Abstract
The appropriate federal structure of government is now a policy issue of major debate. This paper identifies three approaches and compares their strengths and weaknesses. Economic federalism recommends the use of competitive communities for the provision of congestible local goods and a strong central government for the provision of pure public goods and spillovers. Cooperative federalism recommends intercommunity agreements; democratic federalism prefers a majority-rule representative legislature. Efficiency will sometimes conflict with other constitutional objectives--political participation and the protection of rights--and compromises will often be required.Keywords
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Economic Model of Representative DemocracyThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997
- Strategizing in small group decision-making: Host state identification for radioactive waste disposal among eight southern statesPublic Choice, 1995
- Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United StatesColumbia Law Review, 1994
- Empirical tests of the Samuelsonian publicness parameter: Has the right hypothesis been tested?Public Choice, 1993
- Bargaining in LegislaturesAmerican Political Science Review, 1989
- A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional NormsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1979
- Federalism: Problems of scalePublic Choice, 1969
- ExternalityEconomica, 1962
- The Problem of Social CostThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1960
- A Pure Theory of Local ExpendituresJournal of Political Economy, 1956