Winner's Curse in Discriminatory Price Auctions: Evidence from Norwegian Treasury Bill Auctions
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper studies bidder behavior using a detailed data set consisting of actual bid distributions in Norwegian Treasury bill auctions held during 1993-1998. TKeywords
All Related Versions
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