Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: a comment
- 31 August 2003
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 423-436
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(03)00040-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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