The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
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- 1 February 2011
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 101 (1) , 411-429
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.411
Abstract
A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance. (JEL C71, C73)Keywords
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